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The decoy state protocol was proposed to overcome the primitive photon number splitting attack. When using a better strategy, 
the attacker can ensure that the ratio of the overall gain of the signal state pulse against the decoy state pulse changes very little, 
even to keep the overall gain of the signal state pulses equal to that obtained without attacker. In this paper we first give a model 
of the partial photon number splitting attack which contains the original one, and then find that the decoy state protocol still works 
effectively under the partial photon number splitting attack. 
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) makes two communica-
tion entities, Alice and Bob, sharing a secure random se-
quence. The most commonly used protocol, BB84 protocol, 
is based on the single photon source. But for the limitations 
of the technical, the actual QKD systems usually use the 
weak coherent source, where the statistical distribution of 
the number of photons is Poisson distribution. So the prac-
tical pulse sequence contains some multi-photon pulses, 
even when the average photon number of a pulse is about 
0.1. The eavesdropper can use this weakness to do photon 
number splitting (PNS) attack [1–3]. Her attack strategy is 
to remove all the single photon pulses and steal one photon 
from each multi-photon pulses, and then send the rest to 
Bob over a lossless channel. Since the photons stolen by 
Eve carry the same information with photons sending to 
Bob, Eve can obtain all the information between the legiti-
mate users. 
Using the method of decoy state [4–6] is a very good so-
lution to overcome the splitting attack. In the decoy state 
protocol, Alice and Bob use different intensity of the laser 
to confuse the attacker. Using the gain and the error rate of 
the signal sate and decoy state, legitimate users can calcu-
late the lower bound of Q1 and the upper bound of E1. They 
are the response rate and quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 
the single photon pulses respectively. Then they can calcu-
late the secure key rate by the GLLP formula [7,8],  
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where, q is associated with the used protocol, for BB84 
protocol q is set to 0.5. Qμ and Eμ are measured directly 
from the experiment, they are the gain and the QBER of the 
signal pulses with the average photon number of μ. Function 
f(x) indicates the error correction efficiency, and the func-
tion H2(x) indicates the binary Shannon information. In the 
past few years, many point-to-point QKD experiments and 
QKD networks based on the decoy state method have been 
proposed [9–16]. 
In PNS attack strategy, when the loss of the quantum 
channel between the two legitimate users is very large, the 
gain at Bob’s side may be very large when Eve using the 
lossless channel. An improved strategy proposed by Chen et 
al. [17] is use to solve this problem. In this new strategy, at-
tacker would need additional blocking part of the multi- 
photon pulses. On the contrary, when the loss of the quan-
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tum channel is low enough, Eve can not compensate the 
yield of pulses. So in this case, she may use a new strategy 
that is letting some of the single photon pulses through. The 
partial photon number splitting attack contains those two 
strategies. Choosing appropriate passing fractions, Eve can 
ensure that the ratio of the overall gain of the signal state 
against the decoy state changes very little, even to ensure 
the overall gain of the signal state pulse equal to that ob-
tained without attack. So under those attack strategies, the 
system based on BB84 protocol with decoy state method 
can generate the security key? In the rest of the paper we 
will give a model for the PNS attack which will contain the 
above attack strategies and then analyze the security of the 
decoy state protocol under this attack mode. 
1  Model of the partial PNS attack 
The actual system uses the attenuated laser pulses. The dis-
tribution of the photon numbers in each pulse is Poisson. 
For a one decoy system, Alice set the signal state and decoy 
state’s average photon numbers to μ and ν. The quantum 
channel’s length is  (km), with the loss coefficient  
(dB/km). Then we can express the transmittance of the 
quantum channel as /1010    . If there is no eaves-
dropper, the photon number distribution at Bob’s side is still 
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In the partial PNS attack, Eve’s attack strategy is block-
ing part of single photon pulse and multi-photon pulse. The 
blocking ratios are 1−Px and 1−Py. She extracts one photon 
from each pulse of the rest Py multi-photon pulses, and then 
sends those pulses and the rest Px single photon pulse to  
Bob. In this case, the photon number at Bob's side no longer 
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 (3) 
This mode contains several PNS attack strategies. When 
{Px =0, Py =1}, it is just the primitive attack scenario, where 
Eve only deals with the multi-photon pulses. When the 
channel transmittance is very small, in order to reduce the 
probability of been discovered, Eve need to block some of 
the multi-photon pulse or use a loss channel, thus in this 
scenario {Px =0, Py(0.1)}. On the contrary, if the channel 
transmittance is very large, Eve may allow part of the sin-
gle-photon pulses passing. Choosing an appropriate value  
of Px and Py, Eve may keep the ratio of the overall gain of 
the two states very close to that obtained without attack. 
Then the probability of discovery is maintained at a very 
low level. 
2  The change of the overall gain 
The transmittance of Bob’s side is B, which includes the 
detector efficiency and the internal loss of the optical com-
ponents. Y0 is use to stand for the background noise, which 
includes the dark count of the detector and other noise. 
When there is no eavesdropper, Alice and Bob will find that 












  , here B    . 
When given a n-photon pulse at the entrance of the in-
strument of detection’s side, the conditional response prob-
ability of the detector, Yn, is given by 
 0 1 (1 .)
n
n BY Y       (4) 
So under our PNS attack mode, the signal state’s overall 
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Similarly, the decoy state’s overall gain Q at the detec-
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. (6) 
According to the decoy state method, if Alice or Bob find 
the ratio of the overall gain Q/Q much different from the 
ratio obtained without eavesdropper, they abort the whole 
protocol. Considering the vacuum + weak decoy state BB84 
QKD system with GYS parameters [18], the mean photon 
number are set to  = 0.6 and  = 0.2, the quantum channel 
is 50 km with 0.21 dB/km loss coefficient, the whole trans-
mittance at Bob’s side is B = 4.5%, and Y0 = 1.7×10−6. So 
the overall gain of the signal state without eavesdropper is 
0.0024 and the ratio of the overall gain is about 2.9934. 
In the presence of Eve, we first consider that the overall 
gain of the signal state equal to that obtained without 
eavesdropper, then we can get the following condition 
equation, 
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Using the above parameter values, this equation can be 
simplified to 
 1x yP P
      , (8) 
where eB
    , 1 e (e e ) / (1 )B B          
and e B   = 0.9734. From the simplified equation, the 
ratio of the through single-photon and multi-photon pulses Px 
and Py are related to the channel’s transmission efficiency. 
When the transmittance of the quantum channel is very 
low, Eve need to block part of the multi-photon pulses. Here, 
we get   = 0.0891 when the quantum channel is 50 km. 
The ratio of the overall gain decreases as Px increases and 
increases as Py decreases. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
Eve selects the appropriate parameters to keep the overall 
gain of the signal states unchanged. When she set Px to 0, 
she may obtain the most information of the key with a high 
probability to be discovered, since the ratio of the overall 
gain has value of 7.8562 which deviates obviously from 
2.9934. And when she set Py to 0, she can not get any in-
formation of the key. Only in the case she set Px to 0.0906 
and Py to 0.1599, the ratio of the overall gain almost equal 
to the ratio obtained without eavesdropper, Eve may get part 
of information without been found. 
In the normal case, she do not need the overall gain of 
the signal states remain the same with the value obtained 
without eavesdropper, the ratio of the overall gain changing 
with Px and Py are shown in Figure 2. Here Px, Py[0,1]. We 
find that when the ratio of Px and Py is about 0.57, selected 
an appropriate value of Px, the value of Q/Q is almost 
close to the value got from the case without attack. 
3  The security analysis 
In partial PNS attack, Eve might steal some information  
 
 
Figure 1  The ratio of the overall gain changed with Px and Py, respec-
tively, when the overall gain of the signal states equal to that obtained 
without eavesdropper.  
 
Figure 2  The ratio of the overall gain changed with Px and Py . 
without been detected. However, Alice and Bob can remove 
the stolen information by post processing. Using the decoy 
state protocol, first we need to get the lower bound of the 
conditional probability of the detection event when given 
that Alice sends a single photon pulse, then we can estimate 
the QBER of single photon pulses E1 and the gain of single 
photon pulses Q1. This lower bound of the conditional 
probability can be calculated by 
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 (9) 
However, the actual value of this conditional probability 
under the partial PNS attack can be expressed as 
 [1] 0
F
x BY P Y  .  (10) 
According to the decoy state theory, if the actual value of 
the conditional probability is bigger than the lower bound, it 
means that the two legitimate users can always share the 
secure key. 
In the case that the overall gain of the signal state pulses 
equal to that obtained without eavesdropper, for a given Px, 
we can obtain the overall gain of the two states by the eqs.  
(5) and (6), and then compare the lower bound obtained by 
the eq. (9) with the actual value obtained by the eq. (10). 
The Figure 3 shows those two values. The solid line repre-
sents lower bound and the dotted line represents the actual 
value. The solid line is always below the dotted line, which 
means that [1] [1]
F LY Y  is always true and Alice and Bob can 
always generate secure keys according to the GLLP formula. 
So the system with decoy protocol is safe in this special 
PNS attack. 
In the normal case, Eve can randomly select the values of 
Px and Py. For a given Px, we first get the maximum value of 
[1]
LY for all Py, then compare the actual value with this max-
imum value. The Figure 4 is given this result. The solid line 
represents the maximum value and the dotted line represents 
the actual value. The solid line is always below the dotted 
line, this means [1] [1]
F LY Y is always true. So the legitimate  
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Figure 3  Condition: the overall gain of the signal state pulses equal to 
that obtained without eavesdropper. The solid line represent the value of 
the lower bound for a given Px, the dotted line represent the actual value. 
 
Figure 4  The solid line represent the value of the lower bound for a 
given Px, the dotted line represent the actual value. 
users can always generate secure key in the normal case. 
Thus we can conclude that the system with decoy protocol 
is safe in any type of PNS attack. 
4  Conclusion 
We gave a model of the partial PNS attack, in which the 
PNS attack is a special case. Then, based on the model, we 
analyzed the change of the overall gain and found that the 
ration of the overall gain of the signal-state pulses against 
that of the decoy-state pulses changed rapidly with the frac-
tions of the pass single photon pulse and the multi-photon 
pulses. When choosing appropriate fraction, the ratio can 
remain unchanged which means that eavesdropper may ob-
tain part of the key information with a lower probability to 
be discovered. Finally, we proved the decoy-state protocol 
is secure under the partial PNS attack. 
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